This article examines the relationship between environmental and cognitive structure. One of the key tasks for any agent interacting in the real world is the management of uncertainty; because of this the cognitive structures which interact with real environments, such as would be used in navigation, must effectively cope with the uncertainty inherent in a constantly changing world. Despite this uncertainty, however, real environments usually afford structure that can be effectively exploited by organisms. The 
ity to exactly memorize every facet of a new environ--ment ; on the contrary, it is much more likely that humans are able to efficiently extract and organize the minimum information they are likely to need. This article examines the mechanisms for this efficiency and when these mechanisms do and do not work. The premise of the article is that humans, through the process of evolution, have learned to exploit structures common to many environments. The discussion in the article focuses upon environments of the sort inv olved in navigation, but the scope is more general, even including abstract environments and other organisms. The article relies heavily upon the example of human cognitive maps, but this is because they exemplify so many representational principles and because so much of cognition is spatially based. A central topic is how an organism, when faced with a completely new set of information, can effectively organize that information in a useful fashion. Even before then, however, the organism must first be able to recognize that it is faced with new information, rather than simply a new view of old information.
An organism which only interacts in a single niche can evolve specialized structures to maximize its efficiency within that niche; however, as organisms adapt to more and more environments, some of this efficiency must be sacrificed for general purpose structures. Success (Chown, Kaplañ Kortenhamp, 1995) , and R-PLAN (Kortenkamp, Chown & Kaplan, 1996) . PLAN (prototypes, Loca- tions, and Associative Networks) is a model of human cognitive mapping and R-PLAN (Robot-PLAN) is an instantiation of PLAIN on an actual mobile robot. This article could be considered the third of a sequence in which 1) a model of human cognitive mapping was presented, 2) that model was extended for use by a mobile robot, and 3) it is shown that the structures of the model are further generalizable, applying even to abstract environments. Since this article relies upon the models presented in the previous papers, the essential properties of those models will be reviewed over the course of the article.
This research is based upon the premise that operating in real environments has guided and constrained the evolution of human mental representations. If the claims of this article are true -that the ability of humans to learn new environments is reliant upon generic properties and structures of environments -then there are implications in terms of human functioning. In fact there is already strong evidence for this; the literature linking different environmental configurations to health and performance is substantial (for extensive discussions and reviews see (Kaplan & Peterson, 1993; Kaplan and Kaplan, 1988) . The primary thesis of this literature is that some environments (generally natural environments) enhance functioning because they resonate with human cognitive structure. For example, many studies have shoivn that natural environments reduce attentional demands on humans; further, experiencing these environments can have a kind of restorative impact cognitively, leading to improved performance (Kaplan, 1993; Tennessen & Cimprich (1995) ) and even health (Cimprich, 1993) . Closely related to this work is the idea that people are more at ease in some environments than in others (~,~Teismarl, 1981;  Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) . In many respects this article is a bridge to such work by examining the relationship between environmental and mental structure. It has been argued by numerous researchers that spatial structures and spatial reasoning are fundamental to much. of cognition (Lakoff, 1987) , and spatial cognitive structure, or cognitive maps, serve as the basis for most of the discussion in this article. One PLAN is similar to a number of other computational models of cognitive mapping, notably TOUR (Kuipers, 1978) and Navigator (Gopal, lrlatzky & Smith, 1989) , with regard to the underlying theory of route maps. Much of the analysis of those parts of the representation applies to those systems as well (for a more thorough comparison of these and other systems see (Chown, et al, 1995) ). Differences include the use of scenes to create survey maps, a feature that other cognitive mapping representations lack, and in the fact that R-PL£N has been instantiated on an actual mobile robot. In addition the gateway construct represents a significant step towards understanding the relationship of the environment to its representation because it provides the basis for hierarchical cognitive structure.
The article begins with an examination of tivo of the major paradigms for dealing with environments, the behavior-based and knowledge-based approaches, and proposes that a kind of synthesis of the two is both desirable and possible. The major purpose of this section is to introduce some of the issues involved in trying to cope with real world environments. In the two subsequent sections the essential components of the PLAN model are presented in light of the proposed synthesis. In these sections the emphasis will be on the strong relationship between environmental and cognitive structure and the resultant structured ability to cope with uncertainty. The critical factor inv olved in balancing these approaches is the proposition that there is enough structure inherent in most environments to make internal models worthwhile even though there is enough uncertainty to make precise models impractical. Finally, a more general framework is discussed, which travels beyond the scope of navigation. (Craik, 1943, p. 61 (Bates and Elman, 1992) , the inherent brittleness of such systems (Holland, 1986) , and perhaps most telling, the fact that even if such perfect knowledge is achievable, putting it to use is an intractable problem (Chapman, 1987 (Brooks, 1991) . Behavior-based systems do not rely upon high level world models. Instead, they count on the environment to provide any necessary informa--tion. While this position is often presented as being somewhat radical and new it actually has a great deal in common with behaviorism and the theories of J.J. Gibson. Gibson, like the behavior-based group, postlated that there was no representation of the world in the head (Gibson, 1966 (Brooks, 1986; Council, 1992; 1Bfadadevan & Connel, 1992; Florswill, 1993; Bonasso, Kortenkamp & Miller, 1995 (Hebb, 1949; 1980;  Kaplan, Soni.ltag & Chown, 1991 
Sequence -networks
In the early developmental stages of children (and for adults in novel environments), cognitive maps are essentially a topologically structured collection of landmarks (Piaget and Inhelder, 1967; Siegel and White, 1975) (Macphail 1987 (1991) ). Spreading activation search consists of activating the nodes in the network which correspond to the start and goal nodes and propagating activity. through the network. Nodes which are active will in turn activate nodes to which they are linked. The result is that aetivity will spread out from the two initial nodes until the two waves of activity coalesce. Once the waves have intersected a potential path has been found (for more details see (Levenick, 1991) (Byrne, 1979; O'NeiV, 1990; (Brooks, 1985) , among other places. (Kaplan, et al. 1991; Sonntag, 1991 -, Chown, 1994 
